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THE INAPPLICABILITY OF MARKET
THEORY TO ADOPTIONSt
TAMAR FRANKEL AND FRANCIS H. MILLER*
Judge Posner addresses an important issue. More than 130,000 couples in
this country want to adopt children, and plenty are available. But most
couples want healthy, white infants, and those children are in short supply.
To get the child of their choice, these couples are forced to pay large sums of
money to intermediaries. On the other hand, many unwed, teenage women
face unwanted pregnancies. Many of them opt for abortion, which is rela-
tively inexpensive, or for carrying to term and raising the children them-
selves, which is governmentally subsidized. But few of these women choose
to have the child and give it up for adoption, in part because there is no
financial incentive to do so. Judge Posner aims to change that.
To address the shortcomings of the existing adoption system rationally,
we must separate the issue into two components. The first is informational.
There is no efficient means for prospective adoptive parents and women with
unwanted pregnancies to contact each other. "Privatizing" adoption agen-
cies and relaxing regulation of these intermediaries would reduce informa-
tion costs. Like dating services, adoption agencies could, for a fee, bring
interested parties together. There is no reason not to stimulate the growth of
such a market of information.
We should be aware, however, that while dating services bring together all
relevant parties, adoption agencies cannot. Adoptions involve an important
but unrepresented third party-a baby who is unable to fend for himself or
herself,' yet whose whole life depends on the transaction.
The second component of the issue Judge Posner addresses is more
serious. There are fewer "desirable" children (healthy, white infants) than
prospective adoptive couples-the "demand" for these babies exceeds the
"supply." The problem is one of both allocation and production. First, there
is no efficient means to determine who should receive the "desirable"
babies. Judge Posner believes that a freer market is the solution. Second, the
adoption system has too few "desirable" babies but too many children
adoptive parents simply do not want. 2 Judge Posner does not address the
t © 1987 by Tamar Frankel and Frances H. Miller.
* Professors of Law, Boston University School of Law.
We refuse to dehumanize the baby and call him or her "it."
In his first baby selling article, Judge Posner referred to the excess supply of
black and impaired babies, and of children who are no longer babies as a "glut."
Landes & Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323,
324-25 (1978).
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production aspect explicitly, but he seems to believe that the market model
will resolve this issue as well.
Judge Posner's proposal seems mild. He would leave intact most current
adoption regulation; all he proposes is a little experiment. His proposal is
also rational in that improving product allocation and stimulating produc-
tion by offering financial inducements have worked, in other commodities
markets, to satisfy consumer demand. Opposition to his proposal, therefore,
may seem not only irrational, but almost hysterical. Certainly, Judge Posner
is at a loss to understand why anyone would quarrel with his "little"
experiment; this comment offers an answer.
The adoption problem is similar to the dilemma confronting marriage-
minded singles: they seek marriageable, attractive, intelligent, giving, warm,
and financially secure spouses, but find them in short supply. These people
may then be "forced" to remain single or to marry spouses who lack one or
more of the desirable attributes, because the law prohibits people from
obtaining their spouses of choice by force or purchase.
Some adoptive parents, too, are "forced" by the law to take "less desir-
able" (non-white, older, or physically or mentally impaired) children. 3 These
adoptive parents must choose between their need to nurture a child and their
preference for adopting a healthy, white infant. In short, for public policy
reasons, the allocation of spouses to mates and of children to adoptive
parents is currently outside the money exchange market.
In our society, people produce children primarily for "use value": to love
them, to care for them, and to satisfy the children's emotional and physical
needs. The rewards of child rearing are assumed to be predominantly in the
giving. Furthermore, our society's ethos is that the child is entitled to all
these "goodies." He or she must "pay" for them only in obedience, and
even that only up to a point. Parents are not entitled to sell their children's
labor, since state labor laws prohibit children from working until they reach
adolescence. The law denies exchange value for any human from the day he
or she is born, and thus precludes a market approach to the production and
allocation of people.
Arguably, this is an overstatement. Our society does permit the conver-
sion of human labor into a commodity, and attributes exchange value to that
labor. In fact, our society encourages such a conversion by providing mar-
3 Judge Posner believes that adoptive parents "subsidize" non-white and impaired
babies. The basis of this statement escapes us. Presumably, he assumes that "less
desirable" children are better off even with adoptive parents for whom they are a
second choice than with their natural mothers. Presumably he also assumes that
"less desirable" children are going to be better off with adoptive parents even if they
would pay less for them. Finally, he assumes that rather than trying to place "less
desirable" children with adoptive parents, we should simply make them wards of the
state. We question all these assumptions.
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kets for labor. Indirectly, society even forces people to sell their labor in
order to buy economic survival. 4
Nonetheless, the sale of labor is accompanied by the adult laborer's
consent and substantial freedom of choice. The value of labor depends on
the worker's willingness to provide it. We have learned that in trying to
induce desired behavior from adults, incentives are generally more effective
than coercion. Moreover, a laborer can decline to offer his or her services
whenever he or she chooses, and once hired can terminate his or her
services at any time. This is so even if the laborer would be breaching a
contract because there generally is no right to specific enforcement of a labor
contract.
Adoption, on the other hand, transfers full control over a baby from one
person to another. Infants have no say in the matter; they have no way of
terminating the contract made in their behalf. The duration of an adoption
contract is 18 or 21 years, the formative period in a human being's life, and
they are neither consensual nor terminable. With few exceptions, adoption
agreements will be specifically enforced.
By describing the adoption system in the language of economics-
"market," "commodity," "supply and demand"-Judge Posner creates a
model for the parent-child relationship that differs fundamentally from the
traditional fiduciary model. He explains his use of these terms as a mere
heuristic, 5 yet the words are crucial because they shape the reader's percep-
tion of Judge Posner's proposal. Only if one accepts his terminology, and
thus his model, does Judge Posner's conclusion seems so logically irrefut-
able. But his model, like all models, is incomplete. His proposal may
maximize commodity values, but it ingnores completely the non-commodity
values we find essential to any viable alternative to the existing adoption
system. 6
His model turns a baby into a commodity. By adding exhange value to a
baby's traditional use value, the model affects both the allocation and
production of babies. Under Judge Posner's proposal, babies would be
allocated to the prospective adopters who could best afford them-a radical
shift from the current emphasis on the prospective adopters' appropriate-
ness as parents. His model would also change the current emphasis with
4 Society only supports humans when they are unable to survive on their own.
What inability to survive means may change with social mores. Under the Reagan
administration, the definition of ability to survive is broadening, forcing people to
exchange their labor for money even if this labor seems to them coercive. See, e.g.,
Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-198, § 1517, 99 Stat. 1354, 1573-74 (codified at
7 U.S.C § 2015) (making persons who refuse job training ineligible for food stamps).
5 Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U.L. REv. 59, 64
(1987).
6 Cf. Stewart, Regulation in aLiberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values,
92 YALE L.J. 1537, 1538 (1983) ("market economy stunts personal development by
narrowing the terms of human association and fostering commodity consumption as a
dominant value").
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respect to the production of babies. When products are created for use, as
babies are, the emphasis is on the relationship between producers and
product, between parents and baby, and on the use to which the product will
be put. A commodity, on the other hand, is produced for exchange, and the
benefit to the producer shifts from use to profit. With commodities, unlike
use-value products, the volume of production depends not on the producer's
needs or desires but on the demands of others; it increases with demand and
decreases with over-supply.
The market model therefore answers Judge Posner's concern about the
unsatisfied demand for babies. Focusing on what consumers want, as is
appropriate in a commodity market, he aims to increase the supply of white
babies until their price reaches an equilibrium. Naturally, he opposes abor-
tion: aborting white babies decreases supply.
Judge Posner's proposal uses money and market demand to provide
incentives for having babies-white babies, that is. The resulting reduced
demand for minority and unhealthy babies may indirectly induce unwed
minority mothers to abstain from bearing children (if not to abort). Since
adoptive parents will no longer "subsidize" these babies, the government's
burden of supporting them will increase. In response, the government may
increase pressure on the potential mothers of such "undesirables" not to
produce. I
Judge Posner's model also makes babies fungible, smoothing over the
intangible qualities that make each child unique. If a baby's value can be
expressed in dollars, then a baby can be compared to a car, a dress, a year's
tuition, or a trip to Bermuda. There are already too many parents to whom a
child's use value is less than satisfying without encouraging such dissatisfac-
tion by supplying a competing exchange value.'
Even though Judge Posner does not focus on married couples as produc-
ers, his model affects them as well-especially those parents who value
money more than children, and who can produce healthy, white, marketable
babies. The model may also affect the relationship between parents and their
adopted children. When parents pay a market price for a child, they will tend
to view the child as a commodity; they may regret the purchase, feeling
cheated or overcharged. They may take their frustration out on the child,
attempting somehow to extract more child for the dollar. Natural parents
often do the same thing if the child was unplanned, or if the child has not
provided the emotional satisfaction they expected. Under the market model,
these parents would have a new option-they could sell their baby.'
I This could be accomplished by, among other means, reducing the benefits under
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.
8 Changing the value of a child from that of use to that of exchange has serious
moral implications. Judge Posner thinks the mother, for some reason, is better-suited
than the father to bear the brunt of such change. Presumably, money will compensate
her for that burden as well.
a The predicted results are similar to those concerning other commodities. There is
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Since, in Judge Posner's view, a baby is the product of its mother's labor,
it becomes the mother's (and perhaps the father's) property-there can be
no market without property rights. The idea that children are their parents'
property is archaic. Children can not be forced to work for their parents, or
sold into marriage or apprenticeship. In one form or another, this notion of
children as property was pervasive in this country until about eighty years
ago. Then our society moved from the idea that parents own their children to
the concept that parents are more like fiduciaries. 10 Their power over their
children is held in trust for the child's benefit. This power is subject to legal
constraints, and the child's (as opposed to the parents') interests are entitled
to great weight.
The market model would reverse this development. It would reconvert the
child into the property of the mother, entitling her to sell her infant. That is
why Judge Posner is greatly concerned with obtaining the mother's consent
to the adoption, as he rightly would be concerned with any seller's rights in
any sale.
We hope that our comment explains why some people might rationally
view Judge Posner's proposal as radical. In fact, however, his proposal is
hardly that. Though it seems innovative, the proposal merely revivifies
ancient social theory in the guise of capitalist markets. The proposed market
model for babies demonstrates the power and danger of the image.
Judge Posner's proposal shows how much we have changed: immediate
gratification is the battlecry of the eighties; we worry little about the legacy
we will leave for the next generation. Today most people cannot imagine a
money alternative to their children; in 100 years people just might. There isa
problem with the existing adoption system, but we must seek to resolve it
without destroying the dignity and autonomy of infants. They are the future.
Their welfare is of paramount importance if society is to survive the immedi-
ate desires of this generation.
proof that a person's attitude toward a particular product is dependent on whether it
is produced for self use or for sale. In the latter case, the producer focuses on the
money he -or she will make from exchanging the commodity; in the former, the
producer focuses on the product itself.
10 See generally Zanaldin, The Emergence of a Modern America Family Law:
Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851,83 Nw. U.L. REV. 1038 (1979);
Comment, The Rights of Children: A Trust Model, 46 FORDHAM L. REv.,669 (1978).
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